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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

PATRICIA BOALS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
Case No. 18, 172

JACK MICHAEL BOALS,
Defendant-Respondent.
---0000000---

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a domestic relations action in which the sole issue on
appeal is the custody of the parties' two-year old adopted daughter,
Nicole Marie.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

Trial was held before the Summit County District Court, the
Honorable Bryant H. Croft presiding, on Wednesday, September 9, 1981,
and Friday, October 2, 1981.

Thereafter, the district court entered its

Memorandum Decision (R. at 364-69) on October 26, 1981.

That ruling

found both parents to be fit but nevertheless awarded "temporary
custody" to respondent Jack Michael Boals "while plaintiff is pursuing
her studies, reserving to the plaintiff the right to bring the question
of final custody before the court upon termination of her attendance at
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any university."

(R. at 366.)

Upon learning of the Court's ruling,

appellant withdrew from· the doctorate program in which she had been
enrolled' retained new counsel'
its decision.

(R. at 388-389.)

and moved the court to alter or amend
That motion was heard on December 7,

1981, and the district court entered a second Memorandum Decision on
December 8, 1981.

(R. at 397 .)

By that ruling, the court left

"temporary custody" of the two-year old child with respondent "for a
period of eighteen months from January 1, 1982, following which period
of time plaintiff may petition the court to examine then existing
circumstances and to then determine the matter of permanent custody."
(R. at 399-400.)

The Decree (R. at 447-451) and Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law (R. at 438-46) were entered on December 21, 1981.
This appeal ensued.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant Patricia Boals respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the award of custody (whether "temporary" or otherwise) and
enter its order directing that she be awarded custody of her two-year
old daughter.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellant Patricia Boals (hereinafter

"~.1rs.

Boals") and

respondent Jack Michael Boals (hereinafter "Mr. Boals") were married in
Steelton, Pennsylvania, on November 21, 1973.

(Tr. at 162.)

During

their marriage, the parties formally adopted Nicole Marie Boals, who was
born on November 14, 1979.

(Id.)

At the time of the conclusion of the

2
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proceedings in the district court, Nichole Marie was just over two years
of age.
The action was tried to the Honorable Bryant H. Croft on
September 9 and October 2, 1981.

A number of witnesses were called to

testify concerning the respective relationships of the parties with
Nicole Marie and their ability to care for her.
Without contradiction, the witnesses testified that Mrs. Boals
appeared to be a good housekeeper, that she kept Nicole Marie clean, and
that she cared properly for her physical needs.
40, and 197.)

(Tr. at 11-12, 16, 28,

Mrs. Boals's witnesses also testified that she appeared

to have an exemplary relationship with her daughter, displaying love and
affection to her freely and disciplining her in an able and constructive
fashion.

There was testimony that when hurt or distressed Nicole Marie

turned to Mrs. Boals.

(Tr. at 12 and 40.)

The Record also demonstrates

that Mrs. Boals had been employed as a school psychologist and that she
held a Masters Degree.

In her professional employment, Mrs. Boals was

responsible for the counseling of children and their parents.

(Tr. at

10-11.)
Mr. Boals is a traveling salesman, spending most of his
working time in a county other than that of his residence and occasionally traveling out of state.

The witnesses called at trial generally

agreed that -he was a good father and appeared devoted to Nicole Marie.
However, Mr. Boals admitted, at trial, that he somewhat routinely
engaged in the use of marijuana and that on occasion he had used it in
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the presence of Nicole Marie.

(Tr. at 44-45.)

At a prior stage of the

litigation, Mr. Boals had denied under oath the use of any illegal
drugs.

(Affidavit 11:5; R. at 25.)

In attempting to justify his former

untruthful testimony, Mr. Boals claimed that he did not know that the
recreational use of marijuana was illegal in Utah.

(Tr. at 44.)

Testifying as an expert witness on behalf of :Mrs. Boals,
Dr. Stephen E. Trotter expressed his opinion that she was an able and
exemplary mother (Tr. at 28) and a stable individual (Tr. at 29).

He

also explained that a young female child would be best placed in the
care of its mother.

(R. at 432-33.)

On behalf of Mr. Boals, a custody evaluation was prepared by
G. Blaine Webster.

(R. at 344.)

That report suggested that Nicole

Marie should be placed in the custody of her father, because she
appeared to have a more "spontaneous" relationship with him.
344.)

(R. at

Mr. Webster's professional qualifications are not impressive.

He

has only one year of graduate study in social work and possesses no
degree.

(Tr. at 88.)

He had "just started doing" child custody

evaulations and had completed only about a dozen and a half.
97.)

(Tr. at

The evaluation was based upon several meetings. with .\ir. Boals;

whereas, the evaluator did not see fit to meet with Mrs. Boals on more
than one occasion.

(Tr. at 89.)

appointment with Mrs. Boals.

He also cancelled a scheduled

(Tr. at 92.)

Mr. Boals made several

additional unsolicited telephone calls to Mr. Webster while the
evaluation was being considered.

(Tr. at 98.)

~.1oreover,

Mr. Webster's
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own report indicates that Mrs. Boals is a good mother who cared well for
Nicole Marie (R. at 344) and he admitted at trial that his investigation
"may have been somewhat one-sided" (Tr. at 89).

Finally,

~1r.

Webster

admitted that the testimony concerning Mrs. Boals's parenting abilities
presented at the trial was not consistent with his initial impressions,
upon which his evaluation had been based.

(Tr. at 99.)

The only other witness who testified as an "expert" at the
trial was Richard B. Snyder, called by Mr. Boals.

Mr. Snyder, who

resides in Pennsylvania, holds a master's degree in Zoology, with a
minor in psychology.

(Tr. at 204.)

criminal clinical psychologist..

(Id.)

His employment has been as a
He testified that he felt Nicole

should be placed in the custody of Mr. Boals.
no basis whatsoever for his testimony.

There existed, however,

He acknowledged that he had

never seen Mrs. Boals and Nicole :Marie together (Tr. at 209) and he
admitted that he had only seen Mr. Boals with Nicole rfarie on two
occasions.

(Tr. at 220.)

A review of the Record makes clear that his

views were without substantial foundation and could be of no assistance
in making a reasonable determination as to custody of Nicole

~.1arie.

While in the custody of Mr. Boals during the pendency of the
action, Nicole Marie spent most of her time with babysitters.

This was

recognized by Judge Croft in his original Memorandum Decision in which
he noted that Mr. Boals would have to continue working, but would be
able to continue the services of the babysitter.

(R. at 365.)

On the

other hand, while Mrs. Boals candidly told the district court that she
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intended to continue her professional education to acquire a doctor's
degree, she had been able to arrange her class schedule so that the
services of a babysitter would be needed only three days a week.
(Tr. at 104-05.)
Following the district court's original Uemorandum Decision,
Mrs. Boals elected to sacrifice her doctor's degree and withdrew from
all classes.

The district court, however, denied her motion to alter or

amend the original ruling, noting in his second Memorandum Decision that
the original ruling "was not based solely" upon Mrs. Boals's plans to
further her education and the constraints that would thus be placed upon
her time.

(R. at 399.)

The district court cryptically noted that

"other factors were involved" in the original ruling.

(Id.)

Neither

Judge Croft's Memorandum nor the formal Findings of Fact prepared by
counsel for Mr. Boals and entered by the district court gave the
parties, their counsel, or this Court any insight into the nature of
these "other factors" secretly harbored by Judge Croft.

ARGUMENT

POlNT- i.

IN THIS EQUITABLE ACTION, THIS COURT MAY

REVIEW ALL ASPECTS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS.

While due deference must be extended to the views of the trial
judge who had a personal opportunity to observe the wittnesses, this
Court is by no means bound by the express or implicit findings of fact
reached by the trial court.

This is a custody matter and, therefore,
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highly equitable in nature.

In such an action, it is the duty of this

Court to review and consider questions both of law and of fact.

As

noted in Wiese v. Wiese, 24 Utah 2d 236, 469 P.2d 504 (1970):
This is an equitable matter, and
upon appeal the binding effect of the
findings made by the trial court differs
from that in a law matter. We may here
review questions of both law and fact;
and after making due allowance for the
advantaged position of the trial judge to
observe the demeanor of witnesses upon
the stand, we may be pursuaded that a
finding is against the preponderance of
the evidence to such an extent that we
would be justified in disapproving it or
even making a finding of our own.
469 P. 2d at 505 (numerous citations omitted).

In that case, this Court

rejected the trial court's determination that a child's best interests
would be served by placing him in the custody of his father, reversed
the trial court, and entered a decree awarding custody to the mother.

PO}NT- II.

OTHER FACTORS BEING RELATIVELY EQUAL

AND BOTH PARENTS HAVING BEEN FOUND FIT, CUSTODY SHOULD HA VE
BEEN AWARDED TO THE MOTHER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRESUMPTION
THAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF A YOUNG CHILD ARE SERVED BY
MATERNAL CUSTODY.

The trial court clearly found both parents to be fit.
(Findings of Fact UO, R. at 440.)

The trial court also recognized that

Mr. Boals had only limited time available to him for the care of Nicole
~farie

and would have to resort to the utilization of babysitters·
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(R. at 365.)

Under these circumstances, the factors weighing in favor

of custody to each of the parties were relatively balanced.
When the factors relevant to a custody determination are
approximately evenly balanced, this Court has long adhered to the
principle that custody should be awarded to the mother.

This proposi-

tion was clearly articulated by this Court in Cox v. Cox, 532 P. 2d 994
(Utah 1975).

In that case, the trial court found that both parents were

"fit"; that the wife's conduct had been "less than exemplary" and that
she spent more time away from home "than she should have"; but that the
mother also managed a "well-ordered" home, kept her children clean, and
provided good meals.

Having found the factors to be relatively balanced

between the husband and wife, this Court held that the wife should be
awarded custody due to the presumption that the best interests of the
child are served through maternal custody, noting:
[ U] nder the modern and realistic
trend of law, the mother has no absolute
or invariable right to be awarded the
custody of the children; and that the
father's
rights
and
interests
are
entitled to equal and just consideration.
But this does not mean that the
law must pretend to be unaware of and
blindly ignore obvious and essential
biological differences.
In addition to and quite beyond
the rights of the parents, there is the
important principle that the paramount
consideration is the long-term welfare
and adjustment of the children.
That
being so, we think there is wisdom in the
traditional patterns of thO\~ght that the
roles of the mother and father in the
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family are such that, all other thin gs
being comparatively equal, the children
should be in the care of their mother,
especially so children of younger years;
and that this may be true even where the
divorce is granted to the father.
532 P. 2d at 996 (footnote citations omitted, emphasis added).

In the

present case, all relevant factors were "comparatively equal"; therefore, the trial court erred in failing to award Mrs. Boals custody of
her two-year-old daughter.
This Court relied upon this presumption in reversing the trial
court's custody determination in Steiger v. Steiger, 4 Utah 2d 273,
293 P. 2d 418 (1956).
those of the present.

The facts of that case are strikingly similar to
The trial court determined that neither the

mother nor the father was a "fit" parent to have custody but noted that
the father's parents would act as babysitters.

Accordingly, the trial

court awarded custody to the father on a "temporary" basis.

Thus, as in

the present case, the trial court found that both parents were equally
qualifi~d

to have custody, determined that the father had access to a

good babysitter, and made the award "temporary".

This Court reversed,

holding that custody should have been awarded to the mother:
[I]t appears that [the mother] has been
in the past careless and indiscreet, but
that her love for the child has caused
her to work to provide for him, has
caused her to spend her free time with
him, and care for his needs, and has
caused her to fight for his custody. In
light of these facts it cannot be said
that she is an unfit mother.
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This court has stated that a
divorced mother has no absolute right to
the custody of minor children • • • but
the policy of our decisions has been to
give weight to the view that all things
being equal, preference should be given
to the mother in awarding custody of a
child of tender years, notwithstanding
the divorce is granted to the father.
And this view is based upon the
oft-stated purpose of the award of
custody to provide for the child's best
interests and welfare • • • •
There is no proof in the record that
this mother drinks excessively so as to
render her unable to properly care for
the child, nor is there any evidence of
promiscuity. The trial court apparently
felt that the child could be provided
with a better home than that offered by
the [mother] and made his order so that
she would improve the conditions of the
house and her associations, but in so
doing, he has failed to give proper
weight to other factors here involved.
293 P. 2d at 420 (numerous citations omitted).

Mrs. Boals is far more

qualified for custody than the mother in Steiger; accordingly, the trial
court erred in failing to grant her custody of her daughter.
Another case in which this Court reversed a custody award
based upon the presumption or preference for maternal custody is Dearden
v. Dearden, 15 Utah 2d 105, 388 P.2d 230 (1964).

In that case, the

trial court found that neither parent typified an exemplary parent but
ruled that the interests of the parties' two-and-one- half-year-old
daughter would be best served by placing her in the custody of the
father.

On appeal, this Court reversed, noting that the wife was a

10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"fine housekeeper", and that there was "no evidence that she ha[d]
directly or intentionally mistreated the child." ·This Court also
observed that the mother had
demonstrated
that
she
love[d]
her
daughter by caring for her and providing
for her needs.
This is, of course, but
natural to expect and is the reason for
the universaily recognized . pr-esum};)tion
that it is for the best interest and
welfare of a child of' such tender years
to be with her mother. In such instance,
the mother's right to custody should not
be denied unless it is shown that she is
such an immoral, incompetent or otherwise
improper person that it would be contrary
to the child's best interest and welfare
to be in her custody. .
388 P. 2d 23 2 (footnote citation omitted, emphasis added).
Not only has the proposition that there exists a presumption
that a child, particularly of a young age, should be placed in the
custody of its mother enjoyed the consistent approval of this Court,
that approval has been recently reaffirmed.

In Smith v.

Smith, 564

P. 2d 307 (Utah 1977), this Court noted that while the presumption or
preference was not of statutory origin, it was nevertheless the
"invariably declared· policy" of this state:
[A] ppropriate to be considered
is
the fact that,
irrespective of any
statute, the invariably declared policy
stated in our decisions is that "all
things else being equal,
preference
should be given to the mother in awarding
custody of children of tender years (and
this is true even when) the divorce is
granted to the father."
564 P. 2d at 309 (footnote citation omitted).

Thus, the presumption or
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preference finds firm support in the recent decisions of this Court.
Other cases recognizing and approving the preference include Bingham v.
_Bingham, 575 P. 2d 703 (Utah 1978); Hyde

v~

Hyde, 22 Utah 2d 429,

454 P. 2d 884 (1969); D--P-- v. Social Servfoe anci Child ·welfare
Department, 19 Utah 2d 311, 431 P.2d 547 (1967); and McBroom v. McBroom,
14 Utah 2d 393, 384 P.2d 961 (1963).
A very similar preference or presumption was recently
recognized by this Court in Hutchison v. ·autc:hison, -- P. 2d -- (Utah
June 14, 1982).

In that case, this Court noted that in custody

matters,
the paramount consideration is the best
interest of the child, but where one
party to the controversy is a non-parent,
there is a presumption in favor of the
natural parent. • . . [This presumption]
is rooted in the common experience of
mankind, which teaches that parent and
child normally share a strong attachment
or bond for each other, that a natural
parent will normally sacrifice personal
interest and welfare for the child's
benefit, and that a natural parent is
normally more sympathetic and understanding and better able to win the confidence
and love of the child than anyone else.
-- P. 2d at -- •

This Court, in that case, proceeded to articulate a

comprehensive list of factors that could be considered in determining to
whom custody should be awarded in the event that the presumption was
rebutted.

While the preference or presumption for maternal custody is

not among the criteria enumerated, its absence is explained by its
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inherent inapplicability to a parent/non-parent custody controversy and
is not indicative of any ·departure by this Court from the "invariably
declared" presumption of maternal custody.
Accordingly, unless the district court specifically found that
for some specified reason the relative means or abilities of Mr. Boals
to care for Nicole Marie were substantially greater than those of
Mrs. Boals, the district court could not properly award custody to
Mr. Boals.

POiNT ·ni.

THE FINDINGS OF FACT ENTERED BY THE

TRIAL COURT ARE INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO SUPPORT
ITS AWARD OF CUSTODY TO THE FATHER.

In the formal Findings of Fact entered by the trial court,
which were prepared by counsel for Mr. Boals, only two paragraphs relate
to the custody issue.

In the first, the trial court finds that "each of

the parties is a fit and proper parent" to have custody of Nicole Marie.
(Findings UO, R. at 440.)

In the second, it is merely noted that "a

_custody evaluation was performed in this matter by Blaine Webster" and
that Mr. Webster recommended that custody be awarded to Mr. Boals.
(Findings Ul, R. at 440.)

Accordingly, there is not a single formal

Finding of Fact sufficient to support an award of custody to Mr. Boals.
Even considering the two Memorandum Decisions entered by the
trial court, no substantial findings of fact can be found.

In his

original Memorandum Decision, Judge Croft noted the plans of ~·.1rs. Boals
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to pursue her doctor's degree and obse.rved that she would likely have to
be employed to some extent in order to finance that endeavor.

However,

the court also accurately noted that :Mr. Boals was employed and that his
employment required the "substantial portion of his time" and that he
would "have to rely upon the services of babysitters."

(R. at 365.)

Thus, at most, the "available time" factor was, by the court's own
acknowledgment, evenly divided between the parties.

·Presuinpiion- Fav-ciriilg ·Maternai-Custody- ·was -Not-Re1iuffe<f ·and-the·
District ·court· :Erre<f m. ·AwarCiirig- cusfocty- tO-tlie -Fatlier.

A.

tlie·

Not only do the limited Findings of Fact entered by the
district court not contain any express or specific finding that
Mr. Boals is in some way better able to care for Nicole Marie, those
Findings make clear that both parents are equally fit and capable of
caring for Nicole Marie.

Accordingly, the presumption or preference for

maternal custody has not been rebutted and the district court erred in
awarding custody of Nicole Marie to Mr. Boals.
It is true that the extent to which each parent may be able to

care personally for the child is an appropriate criterion to be
considered by the trial court. (See, Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah
1981).)

In this case, however, the district court made no determination

that Mr. Boals would be able to spend more time with Nicole Marie or to
care for her personally to a greater extent than t1rs. Boals.
no formal Finding of Fact on this issue whatsoever.

There is

Moreover, Judge
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Croft's original Memorandum Decision recognizes that Mr.

Boals was

er:iployed as a traveling salesman and would have "to rely upon the
services of babysitters."

(R. at 365.)

By contrast, Mrs. Boals

contemplated attending class only three days per week and abandoned even
that for the sake of her daughter.

Thus, the trial court's custody

award cannot be justified upon the basis that Mr. Boals would have a
greater amount of time to spend with the child.

a.

n1St-rict cou-rt's -:Failure- to- Enter- speciffo -:Firidlrigs of -:FactCoristifo.tes -&eversil>ie -:Error.
'!'he

This Court has consistently held that detailed, formal
Findings of Fact are essential if the decision of the trial court is to
be meaningfully reviewed on appeal.

For example, in Stoddard v.

Stoddard, 642 P.2d 743 (1982), this Court held:
Written findings
and
conclusions
setting out the basis on which a court's
decision rests are vital to the proper
information of the parties and to the
proper functioning of courts.
Findings
and conclusions aid the trial court in
rational decision making • • • and aid
the appellate court in the exercise of
the discretion it enjoys to review, and,
if necessary, to adjust the financial and
property interests of the parties. • • .
642 P. 2d at 744 (citation omitted).

This court vacated the trial

court's Decree and remanded the case for proper proceedings.

A case

such as the present strongly underscores the need for the trial court
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to articulate the specific facts upon which it believes its decision
rests.
Similarly, in Chandler v. West, 610 P. 2d 1299 (1980), this
Court again remanded a case to the trial court because of the absence of
specific fin din gs of fact.

It was noted:

For this Court to be in a position to
review the propriety of the trial court's
order, it is necessary that proper
findings of fact and conclusions of law
be made pursuant to Rule 52(a), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
610 P.2d at 1301.
Moreover, conclusory generalizations cannot adequately fulfill
the requirement of specific Findings of Fact.

In Wiese v. W~~~~'

24 Utah 2d 236, 469 P.2d 504 (1970), this Court noted that a so-called
finding of fact to the effect that "the best interest of the boys would
lie in their remaining with their father" was not, in reality, a finding
of fact at all.

Rather, this Court held it was "a conclusion and must

be based upon the other findings".

469 P. 2d at 505.

Having determined

that the award of custody to the father could not be supported by the
trial court's other findings of fact, this Court reversed, awarding
custody to the mother.

Id. at 507.

In the present case, the trial court wholly failed to
articulate any substantial findings of fact in support of its decision
to award custody of two-year-old Nicole

~.1arie

to Mr. Boals.

The trial
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court's veiled reference to "other factors" is wholly insufficient to
support its decision.
CONCLUSION

In this appeal from the trial court's award of custody, this
Court must consider and review the questions of fact as well as the
questions of law raised.

This Court has long and firmly adhered to the

proposition that, when other relevant factors are comparatively evenly
balanced, there exists a strong and natural presumption that the best
interests of a child, and particularly of a young child, are served by
granting custody to the mother.
In this case, not only has Mrs. Boals the personal traits and
stability to serve as an exemplary mother to her daughter, she possesses
a high level of professional training and expertise as a school
psychologist.

She has manifest her devotion to her daughter through her

willingness to sacrifice further professional advancement in order to
provide an even better environment for her.

Mr. Boals, on the other

hand, as a traveling salesman, must rely upon the services of hired
babysitters to care for Nicole Marie and has admitted at best demonstrating poor judgment in connection with his personal indulgences in
the child's presence.
Without a single specific supporting Finding of Fact, the
district court has awarded custody to Ur. Boals, thus failing to apply
the relevant law of this State.

That judgment must be reversed and
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custody of two-year-old Nicole Marie must be awarded to appellant
Patricia Boals.
RESPECTFULLY S UB1\1ITTED this

DART

&

1,\<?5 day

of July, 1982.

STEGALL
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